By In the light of the political events of the last few decades, “populism” has become the keyword for political discussions and debates around the world. Political leaders from both left and right of the political spectrum form a part of this conversation. The term “populism” is used to address political leaders in eastern Europe to Presidents in the USA. However, the concept of populism can sometimes be described as almost ambiguous because different authors and actors have given it different meanings. Some define it as an ideology where as some describe it as a movement. The fact that the term itself can be equated to different meanings in different regions further complicates terms. E.g., populism denotes a sentiment of xenophobia and anti-immigration policies in the European context meanwhile the same term equates to corruption along the lines of economic management in the South American context. Such issues lead to the confusion about what exactly the term denotes.
Approaches to Populism
The popular approach to populism defines it as an important element to achieving inclusive politics and mobilisation of the population at large. Advocates of this approach also believe that populism can aid in the development and implementation of model of democracy that is communitarian in nature. This approach was most popular in the United States.
The next approach is important in the field of critical-studies and in analysing the politics of Europe and Latin America. It is known as the Laclauan approach and was made popular by Ernesto Laclau. This approach goes against the popular grain and classifies liberal democracy as the primary issue and suggests a radical model of democracy as the key solution. The Laclauan approach considers populism as the essence around which politics is centred around and also recognises it as an important force in trying to establish a political system of recognition. Populism in this approach can aid in establishing a model of radical democracy to change the status quo and get the marginalised group to actively take part in politics of the state.
The socioeconomic approach to populism was mainly popular and dominant in the 1990’s in the Latin American regions. Economist Rudiger Dornbusch interpreted populism as a form of economic mismanagement. This management was characterised by the first stage where there is massive levels of spending as a direct consequence of borrowing from foreign states and organisations. This was followed by a stage where there is hyperinflation of the market. In the third stage, stringent economic policies are implemented in the state to deal with the hyperinflation. However, this approach has lost its relevance and popularity as leaders in Latin America began to advocate for neo-liberal system of economic management.
A more latter-day approach to populism equates it to a political strategy that is used by a leader that wishes to hegemonize their rule with the help of direct support from their avid supporters and followers. This approach states the importance of a leader who is strong and charismatic in nature. Such characteristics help the leader in employing populist strategies to gain power and maintain it through maintain direct communications with their followers and supporters.
The final approach to populism maintains that populism is a strategy that is useful when it comes to mobilisation of the masses. This approach states that populism is a strategy to garner maximum attention in the media to gain support. Such antics propagate the leader to a position where he is seen as an opposition to the “elites” and being hand-in-hand with the “people”.
Despite the variances in definition, there is some sort of consensus on the core principles of elitism. These principles are “the people”, “the elite” and “general will”. “The elite” in this context is denunciated and the ruling elite are criticised in the interest of the larger section of the population. Hence, it is best to describe populism as a “thin-centred ideology” as it always appears in conjunction with other ideologies.
From Progressive Neoliberalism to Trump and Beyond
In the article titled “From Progressive Neoliberalism to Trump and Beyond”, Nancy Fraser introduces a crisis to its readers. The crisis she is talking about is political in nature. She is referring to controversies around Trump’s presidency, the UK’s dealings in the Brexit deal, the rise of authoritarian leaderships in Latin America and Asia, etc. All in all, Fraser deems this crisis to be global in nature. She goes on to add that all the above-mentioned events share a common denominator. The disintegration and weakening of the elite political classes that were already established is what has led to the current state of events according to Fraser. She writes that although the rise of reactionary populism can be only classified as a political crisis, there are other social-economical problems that add up to the general issues in the world. In the context of the US, issues such as carbon emissions, climate change, increasing consumer doubt, overarching reach of the financial sector found a political voice that ultimately sought to address this hegemonic crisis. At such a time, a political outsider in the form of Donald Trump seized his moment to fill the hegemonic gap in the country. He became the face of the existing hegemonic crisis.
Fraser identifies the fall and breakdown of the emancipatory and redistributive policies of the previous hegemonic bloc as the primary reason for the rise of Trump. The hegemonic bloc before Trump was a progressive neoliberal bloc that combined meritocratic policies of emancipation with economic policies that possessed plutocratic characteristics. There was movement to reduce the influence of the state on the market and move on to an economy that was capitalistic on a global scale. In reality it led to an increase in debt and weaking of unions. Progressive neoliberal polices continued to enrich the economic 1% and the elites on the backs of the hard-working middle-class. On the emancipatory policies front, the progressive neoliberal bloc employed a tactic that was very superficial. The hegemonic bloc sought to promote individuals from underrepresented societies in a meritocratic manner without looking for ways to deal with social hierarchy. According to Fraser, equality had been boiled down to mean a meritocracy. The problem with such a policy was that it was very restrictive. People could enjoy the benefits of a meritocracy provided they had checked a box of prerequisites with regards to social and economic capital. Such movements gave upward wealth redistribution policies a new and more acceptable appearance as it had been endorsed by the progressive groups in civil society.
The hegemonic bloc preceding Modi worked on similar veins. The poster child of British resistance, the grand old party of India; Congress faced quite a number of corruption scandals in the early 1990’s and was being accused of appeasing the minority groups to stay in power. Under Congress leadership, the state economy was liberalised in 1991 to avoid a fiscal crisis.
Fraser writes in her article that there was hardly a difference in the economic policies of both the progressive neoliberal and reactionary neoliberal bloc. The only difference being that the reactionary neoliberal bloc claimed to care for small businesses and tradesmen while continuing with their hidden agenda of enriching the elites and the 1%. Similarly, the move to liberalise the Indian economy was opposed by the BJP leaders in the 1990s but supported it through their “India Shining” campaign when they came into power in 1998. However, they lost the subsequent election as the primary focus was back on the poor and the wealth gap. A parallel can be drawn between this instance and when the progressive neoliberal bloc had to defeat the reactionary neoliberal bloc before Trump ascended to power.
The UPA alliance led by Congress looked to be the foundations for a progressive neoliberal growth model when it came back to power in 2004. Congress led UPA followed a model of rights-based legislation to win back the support of the sub-altern groups. Fraser writes similarly about the progressive neoliberal bloc in the pre-Trump era. Subsequently, MGNREGA act was passed in 2006 and the Right to Education act was passed in 2009. The progressive neoliberal bloc in India wanted to humanise the process of development. Further, they added to the globalisation of the economy that they had started in 1991. Similar to how Bill Clinton won the election by talking about diversity, women empowerment and other progressive social ideals while working towards upward distribution and further globalisation of the economy; Congress too sought to cover up the consequences of a corporate growth model under the guise of inclusive and progressive neoliberalism. The country witnessed its best growth rates post the liberalisation of the economy, under the Congress led UPA alliance. However, these growth rates gradually began to stall. Further, the myriad of scams and scandals that the Congress leaders were engaged in did not help their case either. The frustration and agitation that such events caused among the general population is what led to the eventual forming of the hegemonic gap in India.
The rise of Modi in 2014 propped him to become the face of reactionary neoliberalism in India and fill the hegemonic gap. He was being portrayed as the man to unite the nation under the banner of the common man. However, it was difficult to ignore his pro-big business stance as seen from his time as the CM of Gujarat. The Adanis and the Ambanis of the country poured in to fund the rise of a counterhegemonic bloc in the form of Modi’s BJP and his idea of a Hindutva nation. In his election rally’s before coming to power contained repeated cries of “Sabka Saath, Sabka Vikaas”, which translated to development for all. Such events created conflict of narratives in terms of his distributive policies. Modi and BJP’s politics of recognition remained the same and won over the majority of the population with the “Rising India” narrative. He compounded the failures of the progressive neoliberal bloc by letting people think that the failure of the nation on many fronts was due to their recognition politics and appeasement-oriented policies. He assured his followers that India would take its rightful place on the global stage as an awakened Hindu nation. The reactionary neoliberal bloc propagated the same ideals of representation and recognition but under the guise of nationalism and loyalty. BJP had learned from its previous failures to correctly address diversity to achieve unity (Gudavarathy, 2019). What the progressive neoliberals perceive to be secular, the reactionary neoliberals see it as pseudo-secular.
Despite their being similarities in how the reactionary neoliberal bloc gained power in both India and the US; there are stark differences in between the faces of reactionary neoliberalism in both the countries. For starters, despite not belonging to the political elite classes, Modi was not an outsider to politics like Trump. Both of them might have used the outsider narrative to garner support, but it does not change the fact that Modi had been actively involved in politics before becoming the PM. Secondly, Trump did not share a very fluid relationship with his Republican party which might be attributed to his erratic and unpredictable behaviour. On the other hand, Modi has always had full backing and support from the BJP leadership. This stable relationship is one of the vital factors that aided in his rise to power and even win a second term, something Trump failed to achieve.
Under the current circumstances, it is difficult to envision a progressive counter hegemonic bloc that puts both recognition politics and distributive politics at the top of their agendas. I say this because of the fragmented nature of the opposition in India. Unlike the US, where there exists a 2-party system, the formation of a counter hegemonic bloc becomes that much more difficult in the presence of a multi-party system. No one party would be willing to risk it all in order to overturn the odds. This same problem is further compounded when we see that there is a clear lack of leadership in terms of national scale. Regional leaders exists, but there is clearly no one capable of challenging Modi’s leadership. It would be best for the opposition parties to establish their own internal hegemony before deciding to form a counter hegemonic bloc.
It is not the case of it being impossible, as small cracks have started to appear in BJP’s windshield. The recently repelled farm laws is a sign of that. Modi had to backtrack on his pro-big-business stance in this case. It was another case of misjudgement like that of the decision to demonetise 500- and 1000-rupee notes. The public outrage and blowback at the decision to implement the much-contested CAA regulations was another such instance. With the onset of the pandemic, India is beginning to witness unprecedented levels of inflation and unemployment. Unemployment playing a huge role as India houses the largest working population in the world. Add to this the rising prices of fuel and gas cylinders and edible oil. Rising prices with low income and high unemployment is definitely a recipe for disaster. Things are suddenly not looking very rosy for the Modi government. When things really start to go south, the general population will not care so much about nationalism and unity when they cannot afford to put food on their tables or when graduated candidates cannot find jobs. The scope for a progressive counter hegemonic bloc certainly exists, albeit very slim.
References
- Mudde, C., & Kaltwasser, C. R. (2017). Populism: a Very Short Introduction. Oxford University Press.
- Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Taggart, P. A., Paulina Ochoa Espejo, & Ostiguy, P. (2017). The Oxford handbook of populism. Oxford University Press.
- Fraser, N. (2017, November 20). From Progressive Neoliberalism to Trump—and Beyond – American Affairs Journal. American Affairs Journal.
- Ajay Gudavarthy. (2018). India after Modi: populism and the right. Bloomsbury India.
- Kaul, N. (2017). Rise of the Political Right in India: Hindutva-Development Mix, Modi Myth, and Dualities. Journal of Labor and Society, 20(4), 523–548. https://doi.org/10.1111/wusa.12318
- Mazumdar, S. (2017). Neo-Liberalism and the Rise of Right-Wing Conservatism in India. Desenvolvimento Em Debate, 5(1), 115–131. https://doi.org/10.51861/ded.dmds.1.011
