By Over the years various factors and major trends have shaped and characterised the transformation of the illicit drug trafficking operations and organised crime in the Americas. One of the factors the influenced the evolution of the drug trafficking operations was the cockroach effect. The cockroach effect is the fragmentation and scattering of organised criminal operations within sub-regions and countries.
The world witnessed the growth of 2 criminal powerhouses in the Medellin and Cali Cartels in Colombia. These criminal networks had become so powerful that they could challenge the authority of the state openly. Both the Medellin and Cali cartel were structured in a hierarchical fashion, which had helped them to get to the position they were in. But the bigger their operations got, the easier it got for the Colombian and International enforcement agencies to infiltrate their organisations. The sheer size of their criminal networks contributed towards their eventual downfall.
The downfall of the Medellin and Cali cartel triggered fracturing and dispersion of the criminal networks in Colombia. Law enforcement agencies have found it far more difficult to track down these organisations since this happened (Garzón, 2008). A few organisations would try and get together again, e.g., los Rastrojos. However, the lesson learned here was that it was more difficult for law organisations to track smaller criminal networks. The Colombian state believes that the smaller organisations although difficult to track, pose lesser of a threat because they cannot confront state security directly and openly (Pachico, 2011a).
Cocaine profits in the 1980’s and 1990’s gave a huge boost to the criminal networks in Mexico. This ultimately led to unimaginable violence amongst various criminal organisations to consolidate their own positions and control the all-important shipping routes for their product. Mexico can be still seen recovering from these conflicts. These big criminal networks seem to be gradually disintegrating and following the Colombia model of scaling down. However, this same era has also seen the rise of the Tijuana cartel and the Juarez cartel. These cartels were at one time the biggest trafficking operations in the whole of Mexico. Post the interventions of the Vincete Fox administration; Mexico has seen the rise of new trafficking networks such as Sinaloa, Michocana, etc. and a lot of other smaller group.
There are some who would argue that Mexico has not witnessed the same model of dispersion as Colombia did. This is because of the rise of the Sinaloa Cartel. The Sinaloa cartel is less hierarchical and more federal in nature. Their leader, Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán Loera gives his subordinates more freedom and autonomy and also lets them have more of their profits. The Sinaloa model is better for business as it is more sustainable in nature. Those networks that disintegrated into smaller gangs are now fighting over territory and smuggling routes and have gone on commit murders and cause chaos. Normally this would be bad for business, but this activity has been labelled as “disorganized crime” (Pachico, 2011b: s.p.).
Mexico has also witnessed the rise of paramilitary groups in areas such as Juarez and Monterrey as a response to the large-scale gang violence. This could be attributed to the presence of a weak law enforcement agency and its ability to subdue such gang related atrocities.
Colombia too like Mexico saw the rise of smaller gangs such as the Cartel de Acapulco and Mano con Ojos. The groups are fighting to establish themselves in the Medellin’s criminal history. There was an era peace due to the work of the mayors Fajardo and Alonso Salazar. This era of relative peace came to an end with the resurgence of drug trafficking in the Comuna 13. Such neighbourhoods provide consumers their product and candidates for recruitment for the gangs. The neighbourhood corridors also serve as an effective route for smuggling drugs and guns.
With pressures from both Mexican and American law enforcement agencies, some Mexican organisations have shifted some of their operations into neighbouring countries such as Guatemala and Honduras. The movement of Sinaloa and Zetas operations into these countries have triggered a rise in drug related crimes and violence in these central American countries.[1]
The United States have been focusing on fighting drug production and trafficking in Latin America and the Caribbean since the 1970’s. Counternarcotic assistance to foreign countries has been an integral aspect of the United States’ fight against drugs. The key objective behind the counternarcotic assistance has been to stop the production and trafficking right at the foreign source itself. This done through destroying the crops, intercepting product shipments. They also engage in addressing the social, economic related issues that made the country vulnerable to the dangers of drug trafficking in the first place.
The US congress first gave its approval towards the drug programs in Central America and the Caribbean in the mid-1970’s. This was around the same time when “war on drugs” debate had become popular.
It was primarily focused on dealing with source countries of Colombia, Bolivia and Peru. The Programs involved provisions of equipment and training to destroy the crop plantations and reinforcing the local law enforcement agencies. President Reagan in 1986 declared a directive declaring narcotics trafficking a threat to the national security of the United States.
The Colombian president Andrean Pastrana’s counter-narcotics initiative was backed by the US President Clinton and the US Congress. Colombia’s anti-drugs programs were complemented with a multi-year resistance package from the United States.
Pastrana’s program was called “Plan Colombia”. The objective behind this program was to cut down on the cultivation, production and distribution of illicit drugs by 50% over 6 years. This goal was only met for opium and heroin both of which are not major contributors to Colombia’s drug production. The election of President Uribe in 2002 reinforced this program with the help of domestic security.
President Uribe integrated more comprehensive action plan in 2007 under which military forces would hold a vulnerable area until the residents of the area can receive the necessary social services. This aided in setting a positive precedent towards the government forces in the eyes of the public.
“Plan Colombia” and its supplementary projects received a total aid of around 7 billion dollars from 2000 to 2010. Many agree that these programs have been successful as it has improved security conditions in context to drug production and trafficking.
The Merida was initiated as a response to the Calderon administrations’ request for counter-narcotic assistance from the United States. This program was jointly presented by the George W. Bush and Calderon administrations. The main objectives behind this program were to weaken the criminal organisations and networks, reduce gang activity and strengthen its border controls. This program began in 2008.
The Merida initiative helped strengthen and expand bilateral relations to combat gang activity and drug trafficking operations.[2] The US also promised to decrease their domestic demand for drugs and act against the inward flow of cash and arms to the gangs in Mexico. The “Beyond Merida” initiative started in 2010. This program aims to address underlying issues such as building a stronger boarder, setting a precedent of the rule of law and strengthening the judicial and local law enforcement institutions.
In 2016, 17 of the 20 countries and 43 of the 50 cities with the world’s highest rates of homicides were located in Latin America.[3] Crime in these regions have almost become a part of their daily lives and culture. The violence caused is closely linked with the active presence of the various criminal organisations. However, this wasn’t always the case. Crime in these regions have evolved over 4 to 5 decades. It began with the independent drug trafficking operations and then the Cold War between the United States and then Soviet Union had its own set of consequences in these regions. The criminal networks have gotten more complex and sophisticated with the passing of time.
Latin America has been plagued by a diverse group pf armed criminals and small gangs that are actively partaking in illicit activities across the region. From the “maras” in Central America to the syndicates in Mexico and guerilla forces in Colombia. The historical lack of security forces in this region have also aided in these criminal organisations thriving and excelling.
Not only do these groups cause violence and havoc but also demonstrate their social and political prowess in certain urban and rural areas.[4] They can also influence the outcome of democratic electorate processes via corruption through specific channels.
Organised crime over the decades has gradually has aligned itself with systemic corruption to gain political power and capital in the region.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
- Only Connect: The Survival and Spread of Organized Crime in Latin America – Ivan Briscoe and David Keseberg
- Latin America and the Caribbean: Illicit Drug Trafficking and U.S. Counterdrug Programs – Clare Ribando Seelke, Liana Sun Wyler, June S. Beittel, Mark P. Sullivan
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41215.pdf
- Dudley, Steven S. (2011), “Drug trafficking organizations in Central America: transportistas, Mexican cartels and maras”
[1] https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/organized-crime-central-america
[2] Mérida Initiative: U.S. Anticrime and Counterdrug Assistance for Mexico and Central America, by Clare Ribando Seelke.
[3] Robert Muggah and Katherine Aguirre Tobón, Citizen Security in Latin America: Facts and Figures, Igarapé Intitute, Rio de Janeiro, April 27, 2018, available at <https://igarape.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Citizen-Security-in-Latin-America-Facts-and-Figures.pdf>.
[4] Enrique Desmond Arias, Criminal Enterprises and Governance in Latin America and the Caribbean. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).
